BANKRUPTCY
Supreme Court holds that undue hardship proceeding to discharge student
loan debt does not implicate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Tenn.
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
By Catherine Huie
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes suits
“in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The
Court has also interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to preclude suits against “an
unconsenting State . . . by its own citizens.” However, in Tennessee Student Assistance
Corporation v. Hood, the Supreme Court held that “a bankruptcy court’s discharge of a
student loan debt does not implicate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (“TSAC”) is a government
corporation that was created to “administer student assistance programs” and
guarantee student loans of Tennessee residents and qualified Tennessee students.
Hood was a recipient of such student loans. In TSAC v. Hood, Hood filed a
bankruptcy petition, and the United States Bankruptcy Court granted her a general
discharge of all her debts. Because she did not list her student loans in the
bankruptcy proceeding, they were not covered in the general discharge. Thus, Hood
petitioned to have her case reopened and sought “a determination by the Bankruptcy
Court that her student loans were dischargeable as an ‘undue hardship’ pursuant to”
the bankruptcy code.
TSAC filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Bankruptcy Court denied the
motion on the grounds that the Bankruptcy clause “was a valid abrogation of
TSAC’s sovereign immunity” in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). TSAC took an interlocutory
appeal and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed
unanimously. TSAC appealed the panel’s decision and the United States Court of
Appeal for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, “holding that the States ceded their immunity
from private suits in bankruptcy in the Constitutional Convention, and therefore, the
Bankruptcy Clause, provided Congress with the necessary authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).”
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The United States Supreme Court affirms the Court of Appeal’s judgment
but on different grounds. The Court did not reach what the Court of Appeals
considered to be the determinative issue because discharge of a student loan in a
bankruptcy proceeding “does not implicate a State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”
TSAC “argue[d] that the particular process by which student loan debts are
discharged unconstitutionally infringes its sovereignty.” Student loan debts are
discharged only after a debtor secures a hardship determination in a separate action.
To commence the hardship determination, the debtor must file a complaint and
serve it with a summons on the creditor. TSAC argue[d] that “[b]y making a student
loan debt presumptively nondischargeable and singling it out for an ‘individualized
adjudication’,” Congress has permitted an action against a State. The Court rejected
this argument by noting, “the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is premised on the res,
not the persona.”
The Court stated, “the States’ sovereign immunity did not prohibit in rem
admiralty actions in which the state did not possess the res.” Similarly, the Court
found that a bankruptcy action is also “an in rem proceeding.” It pointed out that a
bankruptcy proceeding is “one against the world” and because the bankruptcy court
has in rem jurisdiction, it is permitted to determine any claim that anyone has against
the property in question, “whether named in the action or not.” Where the
bankruptcy court’s “jurisdiction over the res is unquestioned,” precedent “indicate[s]
that the exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does not infringe state
sovereignty.”
The bankruptcy court had in rem jurisdiction over the case and had “not
attempted to adjudicate claims outside that jurisdiction.” The Court stated that “[t]o
conclude that the issuance of a summons, which is required only by the Rules,
precludes Hood from exercising her right to an undue hardship determination would
give the rules an impermissible effect.” Thus, the Court did not decide whether a
bankruptcy court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a State would be valid under
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court did note, however, that “[i]f the Bankruptcy
Court on remand exceeds its in rem jurisdiction, TSAC . . . would be free to challenge
the court’s authority.”
Practitioners should take note that a bankruptcy proceeding involving the
discharging of loans which a State made or guaranteed is a proceeding in rem and
does not implicate that State’s Eleventh Amendment sovereignty. However, this
case does nothing to settle the question of whether adversary proceedings within a
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bankruptcy proceeding that implicate the need for in personam jurisdiction are a
violation of a State’s sovereignty.
Supreme Court adopts the formula approach to determine the appropriate
interest rate of a Chapter 13 debtor’s future property distributions. Till v. S.C.S.
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
By Meredith Adams Mallard
When a Chapter 13 debtor selects the “cram down option,” by choosing to
satisfy his secured creditors’ interests through deferred installments, the interest rate
applied to the future payments must take into account the opportunity costs to the
creditor, the possibility of inflation, and the risk of nonpayment. Of the available
methods for determining the appropriate interest rate, the United States Supreme
Court found that the formula approach best reflects the principles of the bankruptcy
system in Till v. S.C.S. Credit Corporation.
The debtors financed the purchase of a vehicle with a retail installment
contract that was assigned to the creditor. Approximately a year later, the debtors,
behind in their payments to the creditor, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.
Having promptly asserted a secured interest, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) entitled the
secured creditor to receive the “’value, as of the effective date of the plan,’ that
equals or exceeds the value of the creditor’s secured claim.” The debtor’s debt
adjustment plan provided that the debtor would satisfy the creditor’s interest with
monthly payments.
The debtor proposed that the formula rate, using the national prime rate as
its base, determine the interest rate for the future payments. Although the creditor
argued that the formula rate was insufficient to cover the risk of the debtor’s
nonpayment, the Bankruptcy Court applied the formula rate, recognizing that a
higher interest rate would make it too difficult for the debtor to complete his
Chapter 13 plan. The District Court reversed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court,
supporting the coerced or forced loan approach. The Seventh Circuit modified this
approach with the presumptive contract rate, holding that the court should base the
interest rate upon the parties’ initial loan contract and allow the parties to rebut the
presumptive rate. The dissenting opinion to the appellate court’s decision asserted
that the “cost of funds” method, which takes into account the value that the creditor
has received, should apply when determining the appropriate interest rate.
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The United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts should use the
formula approach when determining the appropriate cram down interest rate. The
Court recognized that this approach for determining the interest rate is superior,
because it best reflects the present value of the debtor’s payments, reduces the need
for costly litigation, and does not overcompensate creditors. Moreover, it provides
for an objective examination of the creditor and the loan transaction by focusing on
the appropriate value of the debtor’s payments instead of on the individual creditor’s
status. In addition, the formula rate permits the bankruptcy courts to modify the
terms of the parties’ initial loan contract to reflect the bankruptcy system’s positive
impact on the risk of nonpayment.
A hearing may be held to determine the appropriate risk adjustment to the
national prime rate. The adjustment will depend on “the circumstances of the estate,
the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization
plan.” Because the national prime rate is modest in value, the burden is on the
creditors to increase the interest rate. The adjustment of the interest rate is limited in
that it should not be so high that it incapacitates the debtor’s ability to complete the
plan.
This decision resolves the disparate views of how cram down interest rates
should be calculated and informs bankruptcy attorneys that the formula rate
approach will be applied to future property distributions. Creditors’ attorneys must
be prepared to present evidence to raise the national prime interest rate to an amount
that will fully compensate creditors for the present value of their secured interests.
Attorneys Beware! A lawyer may be denied fees if a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is
converted to a Chapter 7. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
By Patrick C. Woodside, Jr.
Affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court held that even though 11 U.S.C.S. § 330(a)(1) was
awkward and ungrammatical, the statute was not ambiguous and did not authorize
compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless the awards were
authorized by 11 U.S.C.S. § 327. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to legal
fees for work done after the Chapter 11 bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7.
Petitioner, a bankruptcy attorney for the debtor, applied for compensation
for legal services that he provided to the debtor after the proceeding was converted
to a chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court, and
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the United States Court of Appeals summarily denied petitioner’s application for fees
for the Fourth Circuit. Furthermore, each court held that in a Chapter 7 proceeding,
§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney’s fees unless the attorney has
been appointed pursuant to § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1994. The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994 addressed the subject of professional fees and serious changes were
made. Prior to the 1994 Act, § 330(a) provided:
“(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and
a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court
may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed
under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor’s attorney –
“(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such
trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney. . . .”
However, the 1994 Act changed the language of the statute considerably. The Court
stated, “As can be noted, the 1994 enactment’s principal, substantive alteration was
its deletion of the five words at the end of what was § 330(a) and is now § 330(a)(1):
‘or to the debtor’s attorney.’”
In the present case, Equipment Services, Inc. (“ESI”) hired petitioner to
prepare, file, and prosecute the chapter 11 proceeding. However, three months into
the proceeding, the United States trustee filed a motion to convert the action into a
chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, and the Court subsequently granted the motion.
This ceased ESI’s status as debtor-in-possession and so terminated petitioner’s
service under § 327 as an attorney for the debtor-in-possession. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded to supply legal services to the debtor, despite the fact that the
petitioner did not obtain the trustee’s authorization to do so.
The petitioner argued that the statute is ambiguous. However, the Court
disagreed and stated that “[t]he starting point in discerning congressional intent is the
existing statutory text . . . not the predecessor statutes.”
The Supreme Court’s decision is clear: If the attorney expects to be paid
from the bankruptcy estate under § 330(a)(1) in a chapter 7 case, the attorney must
seek employment from the trustee and approval by the court. This case should not
cause consternation for bankruptcy attorneys as long as they are familiar with the
requisite steps to secure payment in a Chapter 7 case.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
It’s Just a Box: Sixth Circuit forces Tennessee to open up the casket market.
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
By Courtney M. Rogers
The Sixth Circuit held that limiting entry into the casket market to licensed
funeral directors violates the 14th Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses in Craigmiles v. Giles.
The plaintiffs were small business owners within the casket industry. They
sold caskets, urns, gravemarkers, monuments, and flower holders, but not
embalming or funeral services. The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee alleging that the Tennessee
Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (“TFDEA”)1, as applied to them, violated the
14th Amendment.
TFDEA requires all people involved in selling “funeral merchandise” to hold
a funeral director’s license. None of the plaintiffs held such licensure. The plaintiffs
alleged, and the district court found, that this restriction violated both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment for lack of a rational
basis.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether restricting casket sales to
licensed funeral directors bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
The state argued that this restriction promoted two state goals: public health and
safety and consumer protection. The Sixth Circuit found that no such relationship
existed.
Hoping to support its public health and safety goal, the state argued that
requiring licensure assures that dead bodies are disposed of safely and that
communicable diseases are not spread. The court highlighted the inadequacy of this
claim; casket retailers would never be in contact with a dead body. The plaintiffs
merely sold caskets and delivered them to the appropriate funeral homes. Next, the
state proposed that casket quality is important and only licensed funeral directors are
capable of making this determination. The court disposed of this argument by citing
1

The Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers can be found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-5-101, et

seq.
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that no casket standards exist – indeed caskets are not even required when burying a
person.
Furthermore, the district court found and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that a
casket is nothing more than a box. No regulations exist to sell a box, and none
should exist for a casket. Thus, the court concluded that no rational relationship
existed between TFDEA’s provisions regarding casket retailers and the state’s stated
goal of public health and safety.
The state then unsuccessfully argued its goal of consumer protection,
positing that licensed funeral directors are specifically trained to deal with griefridden people and that TFDEA protects casket consumers from fraud and
misrepresentation. The court was unconvinced and rebutted the state’s consumer
protection argument by finding that TFDEA actually “harms consumers in their
pocketbooks.” Market-place competition would alleviate this by lowering casket
prices.
Although the court concedes that public health and safety and consumer
protection are legitimate state interests, they found no rational relationship existed
between the goals and the means in place to achieve them. Noting that it is rare for
a regulation to be struck down by rational basis review, the court found that “[t]his
case should be among this handful.”
In conclusion, the court noted that the only protection afforded by this
regulation is to state funeral directors. TFDEA was the legislature’s “naked attempt
to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from
consumers.”
This case shows that rational basis review is still alive and that state
regulations are not impenetrable. Additionally, this case reinforces that “protecting a
discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate government
purpose.” Business lawyers around the country should rejoice. One more case is in
the books against regulations with monopolistic effects. Everyone else should
rejoice, too. If anyone can sell a box, and a casket is just a box, then that everneeded box will be dropping in price soon.
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CONTRACTS
Note: The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal in the
case of Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, No. M2003-00313-COA-R9CV, 2004 WL 193049, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), on
September 7, 2004. This case involved buy-out provisions that barred injunctive
relief where the parties have agreed upon such provisions in a non-compete
agreement and was the subject of a commentary in the Fall 2004 Issue.
Statute of Frauds does not apply where parties did not specifically agree that
contract would absolutely last more than one year. Birdwell v. Psimer, 151 S.W.3d
916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
By Tracy Dry Clevenger
Applying Tennessee law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that where
there was no proof that the parties specifically agreed that a loan would “absolutely
not be repaid within one year,” the statute of frauds did not apply.
Plaintiff Birdwell sued defendant Psimer on a loan where plaintiff loaned
defendant $30,000. The loan was secured by a note owed to defendant by a third
party, which defendant had assigned to plaintiff. Defendant denied that the
transaction was a loan and instead asserted that plaintiff purchased the note at a
discount. Defendant also pled the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense.
Defendant asserted that the contract could not be performed in one year and that no
writing that complied with the statute existed to commemorate the transaction.
Plaintiff testified that the parties never discussed the transaction as a sale and
produced extrinsic evidence that the transaction was indeed a loan. Plaintiff also
produced the note used as collateral, which included an acknowledgment of the loan
and an assignment of the note as collateral for the loan. Plaintiff’s secretary, who
witnessed the transaction, testified and corroborated plaintiff’s assertions.
Defendant testified that the transaction was a sale and that although the writing for
the assignment of the note mentioned that the note was collateral for a loan, he was
unsure what loan was referred to. The trial court found that plaintiff did not prove a
loan, that the statute of frauds applied, and that the requirements of a note were not
satisfied by the acknowledgment.
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The Court of Appeals stated that when time is an issue, the parties must
agree that the contract will not be performed within one year. That agreement must
be demonstrated in the contract or in the words or actions of the parties at the time
of the contract. The contract must require that it not be performed within one year.
Unless a court can say that it is reasonably probable that the contract could not be
performed within one year, the court should uphold the contract. The Court found
“no proof that the parties agreed that the loan would absolutely not be repaid within
one year.” Therefore, the Court found that the statute of frauds did not apply and
that because the defendant signed the acknowledgment of the loan, the defendant
could not argue that the contents of the document he signed were incorrect.
This case is important to business practitioners because it demonstrates when
a writing is necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds. If a client has entered into a
contract that is not properly documented, the practitioner should determine whether
there is evidence that demonstrates that the contract absolutely could not be
performed within one year before advising the client that the contract fails to satisfy
the statute of frauds.
Exculpatory clauses are valid in Tennessee, even when they protect the
drafter from liability for their own misrepresentations. Ouzts v. Womack, No.
W2003-01502-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2280415, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2004) (permission to appeal denied Feb. 28, 2005).
By Jason Gast
Exculpatory clauses—contractual clauses that relieve a party from a specified
degree of liability—are valid tools in Tennessee, according to the recent case of Ouzts
v. Womack. What makes this case noteworthy is that the Court of Appeals decided
that properly drafted and executed exculpatory clauses can protect a party from
liability—even for their own potentially fraudulent statements.
Husband and wife Michael Womack and Victoria Raub (“Sellers”) put their
Memphis home up for sale in April 2000. When they did so, the Sellers wrote a
residential disclosure statement that stated that their property was not subject to
flooding. Steven Ouzts (“Ouzts”) became interested in the property but was
concerned about the possibility of flooding, so he directed his real estate agent to ask
the sellers about any history of flooding. The Sellers’ agent stated that the Sellers
had not experienced any flooding problems.
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Ouzts was satisfied and made an offer on the house. The Sellers counteroffered and also added an exculpatory clause that said, in part: “[g]rantor has not
made and does not hereby make . . . any representations or warranties of any kind . .
. with respect to the property, its condition . . ., uses or fitness for any particular
purpose.” Additionally, the clause disclaimed any past representations by the Sellers
and discharged the Sellers from responsibility for any representations they had made.
Finally, the clause stated that it would survive the closing and be binding upon the
parties and their successors. Ouzts accepted and purchased the house.
Predictably, flooding damaged the property two years later. Ouzts sued the
Sellers as well as their agent, alleging that the Sellers fraudulently misrepresented
their knowledge that the property was prone to flooding. He sought compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as rescission of the contract. The Sellers filed motions
for summary judgment, arguing that the exculpatory clause protected them from any
liability. The trial court granted the motion, stating that the exculpatory clause
“clearly states that the defendants did not make any representations as to any of the
conditions [of] which the plaintiff is complaining.”
The Court of Appeals agreed. Citing the common law rule that contract
clauses must be interpreted according to their plain meaning whenever possible, the
court then found that the exculpatory clause was unambiguous. Accordingly, Ouzts’
statement that his acceptance of the exculpatory clause was based directly on the
Seller’s earlier representations that were disclaimed by that very clause was inherently
unreasonable. The court went on to add that “even assuming that [the Sellers]
knowingly misrepresented the Property’s susceptibility to flooding, this would not be
a material fact” that would prohibit summary judgment.
Ouzts v. Womack illustrates how powerful exculpatory clauses can be. The
Court of Appeals found that even if the Sellers had purposefully lied to Ouzts about
the possibility of flooding, Ouzts could not complain about that lie because he
knowingly agreed to the exculpatory clause that disavowed any previous
representations by the Sellers. Transactional attorneys should take note of this case,
both when they are using exculpatory clauses and when those clauses are being used
against them. Exculpatory clauses are read literally in Tennessee, even when there
are potentially compelling reasons not to do so.
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Arbitration Provisions: Subject to Enforcement (a two case analysis). Vickery
Transportation, Inc. v. HEPACO, Inc., No. W2003-01512-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
2280421, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2004).permission to
appeal denied March 21, 2005.
By Gennie Gieselmann
An arbitration clause remains valid and enforceable in the absence of duress
or a contract of adhesion. Absent a sufficient showing that the agreement is not
valid, Tennessee courts will enforce the arbitration clause.
Vickery Transportation, Inc. and Grammer Industries, Inc. (collectively
referred to as “Vickery”) operate a hazardous waste transportation business. In May
of 2002, a driver for Vickery was transporting hazardous waste from Helena,
Arkansas to Vickery, Ohio, and made a stop in Haywood County, Tennessee. After
pulling over, the driver noticed that the hazardous chemicals were beginning to react
and spill out of the truck onto the ground. Vickery called Spill Center, a company
that maintains a database of companies who perform hazardous waste cleanups.
Through Spill Center, Vickery contacted HEPACO, Inc. and contracted with them
to clean up the spill. HEPACO began cleaning the spill only after a Vickery manager
signed HEPACO’s standard service agreement.
Vickery became concerned with HEPACO’s method and standard of
cleaning and asked HEPACO to sign an indemnity agreement. When HEPACO
refused, Vickery terminated the agreement. HEPACO filed a complaint to compel
arbitration for breach of contract in accordance with the service agreement. In
response, Vickery filed for declaratory judgment to stay arbitration and compel
litigation by finding the contract, including the arbitration clause, unenforceable
because it was a product of duress or a contract of adhesion. The trial court granted
Vickery’s motion to compel litigation and stay arbitration. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals reversed.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the agreement was not signed
under duress even though HEPACO waited until moments before the clean-up was
to begin to inform Vickery that a service agreement would need to be authorized in
order to start cleaning. The court stated that requiring a signed agreement before
performing services is not “unlawful, wrongful, or coercive.” See Flynt Eng’g Co. v.
Cox, 99 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, according to 28 Samuel
Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 71:23, at 522-23 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th
ed. 2003), duress does not occur when the other party is not responsible for the
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circumstances creating the urgency to enter the agreement. The court found that
Vickery could not claim duress because HEPACO did not create the situation that
required urgent attention.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that the agreement was not a contract
of adhesion. The court based its ruling on the fact that Vickery could obtain the
same service from other companies because the Spill Center had a database of
several companies that provided the same services as HEPACO. In fact, Vickery
made several attempts to secure the services of another spill removal company. The
court ruled that the agreement was not a contract of adhesion, therefore the
agreement and arbitration clause were enforceable.
Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ., 137 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2004).
Third-party beneficiaries are bound by arbitration provisions contained in
contracts when they sue to enforce the contract. In general, parties to a contract are
bound by the agreed terms of a contract, regardless of whether the terms are
favorable or unfavorable. Similarly, third-party beneficiaries with standing to enforce
favorable terms must also accept unfavorable terms. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee reaffirmed this principle by holding that third-party beneficiaries must
adhere to arbitration provisions of a contract even if the third-party beneficiary
considers the provision unfavorable.
The plaintiff, Larry Eugene Benton (“Benton”) received medical treatment in
The Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“Vanderbilt”) after being injured in a car
accident. Benton’s insurance carrier, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee
(“Blue Cross”) had a contract with Vanderbilt stating that Vanderbilt would provide
medical services for a reduced rate and that Vanderbilt would not charge the Blue
Cross members the difference. Blue Cross paid Vanderbilt according to their fee
agreement. However, when Benton filed a lawsuit for personal injuries against the
negligent driver, Vanderbilt tried to recover the difference between Blue Cross’
reduced rate and the normal rate by filing a hospital lien against any monetary
recovery Benton might receive.
Benton filed a complaint against Vanderbilt for abuse of process, breach of
contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act2. Vanderbilt
responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation based on the
fact that Benton was a third-party beneficiary to the contract at issue and should be
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 can be found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101, et
seq.
2
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bound by the arbitration provision. The trial court denied Vanderbilt’s motion by
finding that Benton was not bound by the arbitration provision because he was not a
party to the contract. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that Benton’s status
as a third-party beneficiary required him to adhere to the arbitration provision. The
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed.
The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that, according to Tennessee statute
and existing case law, arbitration is a preferred mode of dispute resolution. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-5-302(a) (2000); Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tenn.
1996). In addition, Tennessee courts have recognized that when a beneficiary
accepts favorable terms of a contract, the beneficiary must also accept unfavorable
terms. Applying these general principles, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded
that arbitration provisions could be enforced against third-party beneficiaries.
The court emphasized the narrowness of their holding by finding that in
order for the arbitration provisions to be enforceable against a third-party
beneficiary; the third-party beneficiary must bring an action to enforce certain rights
found in that contract.
Conclusion
These two recent Tennessee decisions emphasize the judiciary’s preference
towards enforcing arbitration provisions. If an arbitration provision is part of a
sound and enforceable contract, the courts will bind the parties to their agreement.
Further, transactional attorneys should be aware that a contractual provision to
arbitrate will be enforced against third-party beneficiaries when that party files suit to
enforce the contract. The courts are sending a message to Tennessee attorneys:
Arbitration provisions will be enforced.
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EMPLOYMENT
Where there is no explicit language indicating the employer’s intent to create
a binding commitment, an employee handbook does not create an
employment contract. McCarthy v. UT-Battle, LLC, No. E2003-02052-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 350665, 2004 LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004).
By Jason Robert Whitler
Although under Tennessee law, employees are employed on an at-will basis,
the employer-employee relationship is often complicated by the employer’s issuance
of an employee handbook. The employee often considers the handbook a contract
of employment governing the employer-employee relationship. This was the
situation in McCarthy v. UT-Battle, LLC.
In McCarthy v. UT-Battle, LLC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (“ORNL”)
terminated John F. McCarthy’s employment on August 24, 2001, for misconduct in
allegedly directing an employee to falsify her time record. One month later,
McCarthy asked for a peer review of his termination, which was denied as untimely.
He then initiated another appeal which was also denied as untimely.
McCarthy then sued ORNL for wrongful termination, claiming that ORNL
did not follow the procedure prescribed in its handbook (“Handbook”). The circuit
court granted summary judgment in favor of ORNL because the Handbook that
McCarthy was relying on was not a contract of employment.
The issue on appeal was straightforward: did the Handbook create a
contractual right for a peer review hearing?
Under Tennessee law, ORNL did not have to give a reason to discharge
McCarthy because his employment was at-will. Under the at-will doctrine, the
employee or the employer can terminate the employment relationship at any time for
any reason not prohibited by law. Since McCarthy’s employment was at-will, the
Handbook clearly did not govern the employer-employee relationship of the parties.
McCarthy argued that he was entitled to a peer review appeal based on the
holding in Williams v. Maremont Inc.3 Williams addressed the issue of whether an
776 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (Permission to appeal denied by Tennessee Supreme Court on
April 17, 1992).

3
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employee handbook gave laid-off employees a contractual right to be recalled based
on their seniority. The handbook in that case provided provisions that indicated that
the employer intended to create a binding commitment between the employer and its
employees.
However, the Handbook at issue explicitly provided that it “neither implies
nor establishes an employment contract” and “is intended as an informational
guideline only.” Furthermore, it explicitly stated, “the contents of this handbook do
not constitute the terms of an employment contract.” Having concluded that
Williams was inapplicable to the case at bar, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant
of summary judgment to ORNL.
As McCarthy demonstrates, an employee handbook issued by the employer
generally does not govern the employer-employee relationship. In the absence of
language indicating the employer’s intent to create a binding commitment, the
handbook does not establish an employment contract and merely operates as an
informational guide. Employment attorneys in the future should scrutinize the terms
of employee handbooks to see the employer has indicated any intent to create a
binding commitment.
Arbitration award reinstating employee who made racially offensive remark
upheld. Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 363 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2004).
By Megan Jane Wilson
The standard of review for an arbitration award “is one of the narrowest
standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence.” As long as the
arbitrator’s award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” a
court will not overturn the decision even if the court believes the arbitrator
committed a serious error. As Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local illustrates, employers
are unlikely to be able to convince a court to invalidate an arbitration award.
Way Bakery employed union member James Zentgraf as a truck driver. In
February of 2000, Zentgraf, who is white, told his African-American coworker to
“relax Sambo.” Way Bakery fired Zentgraf for violating the Company’s Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) policy. He filed a grievance in protest, which
was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator reinstated Zentgraf’s employment at
Way Bakery subject to a six-month suspension and five year probation period. Way
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Bakery sued to get the arbitration award vacated. When the district court granted the
Union’s and Zentgraf’s motion for summary judgment, Way Bakery appealed.
On appeal, Way Bakery argued two issues: (1) the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of his authority under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), and (2)
the award violated public policy. The court developed a four-prong test to
determine whether the arbitration award failed to draw its essence from the CBA.
“An award so fails when: (1) it conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it
imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is
not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based on
general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms of the
agreement.
The court did not find any evidence to suggest that the award was in conflict
with the provisions of the CBA. Because the EEO policy stated that discipline could
be “up to and including discharge,” Way Bakery could – but was not required to –
discharge Zentgraf. Thus, under the CBA, the arbitrator was authorized to review
Way Bakery’s termination of Zentgraf, and the award did not conflict or add to the
express terms of the CBA.
Additionally, Way Bakery argued that the Zentgraf’s reinstatement violated
public policy, because it impedes the employer’s effort to comply with Title VII and
to end harassment in the workplace. When deciding whether an award violates
public policy, “the court must determine whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of
the contract jeopardizes a well-defined and dominant public policy, taking the facts
as found by the arbitrator.” The central issue is not whether Zentgraf’s conduct
violated some public policy, but instead whether the award granting reinstatement of
employment violated some overt public policy.
The court distinguished Zentgraf’s reinstatement from two prior workplace
harassment cases that had been found to violate public policy where an employee
was reinstated without the arbitrator even determining whether sexual harassment
had even occurred, and the employee was reinstated even though he had a history of
sexually harassing his female coworkers and had been disciplined previously for the
same misconduct. Zentgraf did not have a record of past workplace harassment.
The court also pointed out that even though Zentgraf was reinstated, the arbitrator
still acknowledged that a serious offense had occurred and subjected Zentgraf to a
six-month suspension without pay and a five year probation, during which time he
would be terminated immediately if he was involved in a similar incident. Zentgraf
also had to acknowledge in writing that he understood he could remain employed
with Way Bakery only if he abided by the EEO policy. The court said that the
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arbitration award did not condone Zentgraf’s racially offensive remark, rather it
disciplined him by suspending him without pay and placing him on probation. Thus,
the court held that the award did not violate any public policy.
As Way Bakery illustrates, the court has a very limited review of decisions
made by an arbitrator, and as long as there is some basis for the arbitration award in
the CBA, the court will uphold the award. Also, in order to prove that a
reinstatement award violates public policy, an employer will need to prove more than
reprehensible conduct. In order to violate public policy, the reinstatement award
must follow past similar conduct or fail to punish the employee so that future
misconduct would be deterred.
PROPERTY
The State cannot hold a subsequent owner of land strictly liable under the
Tennessee Water Quality Control Act without proof of violation.
Furthermore, judgment liens against land are not enforceable against
subsequent owners absent strict compliance with statutory requirements.
State ex rel. Summers v. B&H Inv., Inc., No. M2003-01640-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
2113069, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2004).*
By Chris Harris
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held in State ex rel. Summers v. B&H
Investments, Inc., that (1) the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act4 does not impose
strict liability on landowners without proof of violation, and (2) judgments against
previous owners of land do not “run with the land” against subsequent owners
unless specific statutory requirements are met pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5101(c).
The main issues on appeal were (1) Did the Water Quality Control Act
impose strict liability on B&H to abate a condition of pollution caused by the
*

On remand, the Court of Appeals apportioned costs as follows: "[o]ne-fourth of the total cost is
assessed to B&H Investments, Inc., and one-fourth of the total cost is assessed to [defendant] Charles
R. Smith." See State ex rel. Summers v. B&H Inv., Inc,, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 900 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 2004).
The Tennessee Quality Water Control Act of 1977 can be found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-101, et
seq.
4
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previous landowner? (2) Did judgments against the previous landowner run with the
land pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-101(c)?
In its address of the first issue, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that
the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act was developed from the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. The court also noted that the federal statute had also been
construed as a strict liability statute. However, the court pointed out that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act did not “impose liability without proof of any violation
by the owners.”5 The court also went on to explain that “strict liability relieves the
government of the obligation to show mens rea, not the actus reus.” Therefore, strict
liability cannot hold a subsequent owner liable for a violation by a prior owner.
From its interpretation of Allegheny, the Tennessee Court of Appeals vacated
the trial courts judgment that B&H was strictly liable under the Act and remanded
the issue for further review to determine from the facts whether B&H had
committed any actual deeds that violated the Act.
The Court of Appeals also dealt with the issue of whether the previous
judgments against the prior owner “ran with the land” and were enforceable against
B&H. The court explained “a judgment obtained in Tennessee becomes a lien on
the debtor's real property when the judgment is recorded in the register's office of
the county where the land is located.” The court also explained that in order for the
judgments rendered against the previous owner to be effective against B&H (i.e., to
“run with the land”), the judgment on file must contain the parties’ names, case
number, court, date entered, and a description of the property.
The court noted that in this case, the abstracts did not mention the island by
name, nor did they describe the property. Therefore, there was no notice that a lien
was intended to be placed on the island. Because statutory requirements are strictly
construed in Tennessee, the court held that the judgments against the previous
landowner did not run with the land and therefore did not affect B&H.
B&H Investments, Inc. demonstrates that an owner of land can be held strictly
liable under the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act only if the owner has actually
committed a violation. Therefore, a subsequent owner who has purchased land
cannot be held strictly liable for the previous owners’ violation. The subsequent
owner must have committed some violation of his own. B&H Investments, Inc. also
demonstrates that judgments against previous owners of land only “run with the
5

United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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land” if the judgments have been recorded according to the strict requirements of
certain Tennessee statutes.
Transactional lawyers should pay close attention to whether the actus reus
element of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act has been satisfied if there is an
attempt to hold their client strictly liable under the Act. They should remember that
there has to be a violation of the Act by their client in order for strict liability to
apply. Transactional lawyers should also note that if they have a client that has
purchased land, judgments against the property do not “run with the land” unless
specific statutory requirements are met that give their client notice of the judgments.
Landowners may be liable under an agency theory for independent land
brokers’ misrepresentations to potential investors. Arthur Creech, et al. v. Robert R.
Addington, et. al, No. E2003-00842-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 34505, 2004 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2004).
By Emily S. Kaderly
In Creech v. Addington, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a summary
judgment ruling was inappropriate when the issue of agency between independent
land brokers and landowners was a disputed issue of fact. The court of appeals
decision vacated and remanded the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of
the defendant landowners.
The plaintiffs in Creech v. Addington were investors who leased land from the
defendant landowners. The land, located in Tunica, Mississippi was expected to
become highly developed because of casino boats that were moving into the area.
The plaintiffs planned to build multi-million dollar motels on the leased land.
The plaintiffs learned of the investment opportunity at an investment meeting
headed by Lloyd and Betty Link. The Links had an understanding with the
landowners that if the Links found the leases, they could retain any amount obtained
above the defendant landowners’ asking price. From the time of the investment
meeting until the plaintiffs purchased the leases, the plaintiffs were assured by the
Links that financing to build the motels was already in place. However, the financing
the plaintiffs were promised never materialized, and the deal collapsed. The
plaintiffs brought suit against multiple parties, including the landowners and the
Links. The Links were dismissed from the suit based on the statute of frauds. The
trial court, finding there was no issue of material fact, granted summary judgment in
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favor of the landowners on the grounds that there was no proof that the landowners
made any misrepresentations to the plaintiffs.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not properly
address the plaintiffs’ claim that the Links were agents of the landowners and that,
therefore, the landowners were liable for their agents’ misrepresentations. The
appellate court noted that, should an agency relationship be proven, the landowners
could be held liable for the acts of the agents performed on the landowners’ behalf,
depending on the circumstances and the amount of control exercised by the
landowners. The court of appeals held that the question of whether the Links were
acting as agents for the landowners was a disputed question of fact to be determined
by the trial court.
Creech v. Addington illustrates that landowners using independent parties to find
investors could be liable for the actions of those independent parties under an
agency theory. In determining whether agency exists, courts will look at the
principal’s right to control the acts of the agent as well as the amount of actual
control exercised by the principal over the agent. Landowners cannot rely on
summary judgment simply because they themselves did not make misrepresentations
to investors.
A plaintiff can prove an ongoing or recurring dangerous condition in order to
establish notice in a premises liability case, but a layperson property owner
does not have notice when the condition is only recognizable by an expert
absent an agency relationship with such expert (a two case analysis). Blair v.
West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004); Shipwash v. Meadowood Apts., No.
E2003-01528-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 690008, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004).
By Darsi M. Newman
In Blair v. West Towne Mall, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
in a premises liability action may establish constructive notice of a dangerous
condition by showing a continuing condition or a recurring incident indicating the
condition’s existence. Shortly after that decision, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
held in Shipwash v. Meadowood Aparttments that a layperson property owner does not
have imputed constructive notice of a dangerous condition merely because he hires
an expert to inspect for such a condition. In order for the expert’s knowledge to be
imputed to the property owner, there must be an agency relationship between the
property owner and the expert.
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Blair slipped and fell on an oil spot as she was exiting West Town Mall. She
claimed that the Mall repeatedly allowed buses to drop off passengers at that spot
and that the Mall knew or should have known that those vehicles, while stopped at
the mall entrance, would leak fluids that could create slick spots. The Tennessee
Supreme Court had previously held that a plaintiff could establish constructive
notice by proving that the dangerous condition had existed for such a length of time
that the property owner should have become aware of it. However, the Court in
Blair relieved plaintiffs of the difficult task of showing the duration of a particular
condition as long as they can show that the dangerous condition was a recurring
incident or a continuing condition such that the property owner could have
reasonably foreseen its existence.
In the Shipwash case, the plaintiff sued Meadowood Apartments to recover
for damage done when a tree near the apartment’s parking area fell on her vehicle
during a severe storm. At trial, her expert testified that the tree should have been
removed because it exhibited signs of decay before the storm. In particular, the tree
had large holes and white spots on its trunk, and its leaves were brown. Meadowood
contracted with a tree service to inspect all of its trees each spring. The tree service
reported no problems with the tree in its most recent inspection, which was eight
months before the tree fell. The court found that the signs of decay plaintiff’s expert
noted were not sufficient to alert a layperson that the tree was dead. Because the
tree fell in late fall, it was common at that time for trees to have brown leaves. The
court also found that the presence of a visible hole in the tree was not enough to
constitute notice of a dangerous condition. Because Meadowood only hired the tree
service to conduct annual inspections and did not dictate how the tree service should
perform its work, the court held that the tree service was an independent contractor
rather than an agent of Meadowood. Therefore, the tree service’s expert knowledge
was not imputable to Meadowood. Because Meadowood had no knowledge of the
dangerous condition caused by the dead tree, the court held that it was not liable for
the damage to Shipwash’s vehicle.
The Blair decision aids a plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case of
premises liability by providing an easier way to prove the crucial element of notice.
The Shipwash case narrows the Blair decision somewhat by saying that, even if the
plaintiff can prove an ongoing dangerous condition, the condition must be apparent
to a layperson property owner if the property owner has neither expert knowledge of
his own nor an agency relationship with an expert. Attorneys representing property
owners should encourage their clients to hire experts to inspect the property for
dangerous conditions so that those conditions can be corrected before they become
recurring or continuous. However, the client should be advised how to avoid the
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appearance of an agency relationship with the expert so that a court will not later
charge the client with the expert’s knowledge in the event of the expert’s negligence.
Previous contract between predecessors in interest halts major construction
project. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Saul Subsidiary I L.P., No. 2002-CA-2118-MR,
2004 WL 1699614, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 223 (Ky. Ct. App. July 30, 2004).
By Elizabeth Saxton
A trial court, when ruling in equity, may grant an injunction to halt a major
construction project if the court is merely enforcing a previous agreement for
consideration between the predecessors of both parties. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky was presented with this case in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Saul Subsidiary I
L.P.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home Depot”) and Saul Subsidiary I Limited
Partnership (“Saul”) own abutting tracts of land in Lexington, Kentucky. Lexington
Mall arose on these properties in the 1970’s, after the parties’ predecessors in title
agreed in 1969 to mutual restrictive covenants that allowed only for the development
of a mall-type center on the properties. This agreement acknowledged that each
property owner would develop his or her property separately from the other owner.
Before Home Depot gained title to its tract, Saul initiated litigation to
prevent Home Depot from constructing a freestanding store on Home Depot’s tract
of land. Despite knowledge of the original restrictive covenants, Home Depot
purchased the property, destroyed a portion of the mall on its property, and
constructed a freestanding Home Depot store on the property.
The trial court found that the covenants only bound Saul, therefore the court
did not grant Saul its desired injunction. However, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky reversed, holding that both parties were equally bound by the restrictive
covenants and remanded to the trial court for a determination of the proper remedy.
At trial, the judge found that monetary damages were not proper because of the
difficulty in calculating damages. Also, Kentucky decisions require covenant
enforcement and therefore required destruction of the Home Depot store and
replacement of the original structure within one year.
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In upholding the decision requiring demolition of the Home Depot store, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated a rule of equity from the Marshall v. Adams6 decision:
“If parties for valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular
thing shall not be done, all that a court of equity has to do is to say, by way of
injunction, that the thing shall not be done.” Home Depot’s predecessor in title
agreed to the 1969 agreement. Home Depot was aware of the agreement and its
covenants, and Home Depot violated the covenants. In other words, Home Depot’s
punishment was self-inflicted.
If an entity purchases a tract of land, and the entity has knowledge of
restrictive covenants in place on the land but chooses to ignore the covenants, the
entity will likely be faced with an injunction remedy if an adjoining landowner objects
to the entity’s use of the tract.
For purposes of satisfying the notice requirement associated with a
materialman’s lien, a materialman’s contract expires on the final date
materials are delivered rather than the date when payment under the contract
is due. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Varner, No. E2003-1677-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
1144045, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2004).
By Adam G. Smith
In Ruffin Building Systems, Inc. v. Varner, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held
that “for purposes of complying with Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-115, a materialman’s
contract expires on the last date of delivery of materials rather than on the date
payment is due.”
In Ruffin, the defendants contracted with Timberline Construction Company
(“Timberline”) for the construction of a building on property owned by the
defendants. Subsequently, Timberline contracted with plaintiff, Ruffin Building
Systems (“Ruffin”), for Ruffin to supply a portion of the materials necessary for the
construction of the building. The contract between Ruffin and Timberline provided
for payment “net 30 days.” Ruffin delivered all materials required under its contract
with Timberline to the defendants’ property on December 13, 2000.
Although the defendants made their requisite payments to Timberline,
Timberline failed to make payment to Ruffin. Consequently, Ruffin sent the
6

Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
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defendants a notice of nonpayment. Ruffin sent the notice of nonpayment on
March 14, 2001, ninety-one (91) days after the date Ruffin delivered all materials to
the defendants’ property and sixty-one (61) days after the date payment was due
under Ruffin’s contract with Timberline. Furthermore, Ruffin recorded a notice of
lien on March 16, 2001 and later sued the defendants in June 2001 in an attempt to
foreclose a materialman’s lien pursuant to section 66-11-126(3) of the Tennessee
Code Annotated.
Section 66-11-115(a) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides material
suppliers with a statutory materialman’s lien, while section 66-11-115(b) provides the
notice requirement associated with claiming such liens. In order to satisfy section
66-11-115(b)’s notice requirement, a materialman must provide notice to the
owner(s) of property upon which a building or improvement is being constructed
that the materialman is claiming a lien within ninety (90) days after the building or
improvement is completed, the materialman’s contract expires, or the materialman is
discharged. In Ruffin, the court of appeals was faced with the issue of when a
materialman’s contract expires for purposes of providing timely notice under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-11-115(b).
The court of appeals began by noting that out of deference to the legislature,
“Tennessee generally requires strict compliance with its lien statutes.” In rejecting
the plaintiff’s argument that the supply contract could not expire until the date
payment was actually due—thirty days after all materials were delivered—the court
relied on the common law rule providing that “when one furnishe[s] material to a
building site, payment [is] due at the time of delivery.” The supply contract expires at
the time of delivery as well.
In support of its holding, the Court of Appeals stated the legislature is
presumptively aware of the common law interpretation of when a materialman’s
contract expires and has chosen not to amend or revise Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11115 to expressly displace the common law interpretation, despite several
opportunities to do so. The court also stated that if a materialman’s contract did not
expire until the date payment was due under the contract, property owners could
potentially be subjected to continuous liability if a materialman chose unilaterally to
“postpone the time for payment or keep extending such time indefinitely.” In
conclusion, the court further opined that it would be imprudent to surmise that the
legislature intended to allow contractors and subcontractors to contract around
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-115’s specific statutory requirements, essentially exposing a
property owner to liability when the property owner may not be aware of such
contractor-subcontractor contracts.
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In light of the Ruffin decision, transactional attorneys should advise their
clients that in order to claim a materialman’s lien against an owner of improved real
property, a materialman should give the owner notice of the claimed lien within
ninety (90) days after the date the last delivery of materials is made. Additionally,
transactional attorneys should also note that in order to protect property owners, the
Tennessee courts may require strict compliance with all statutory requirements
before finding that a materialman is entitled to a lien under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6611-115.
SECURITIES
Fixed rate investment contracts, like their variable rate brethren, are subject
to SEC regulation. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
By Edward W. Collins
Analyzing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the United States Supreme Court found that the term “investment contract”
encompasses virtually all schemes that promise individuals a financial return in
exchange for the use of their capital.
The respondent, Edwards, was the chairman, CEO, and sole shareholder of
ETS Payphones, Inc (“ETS”). The company sold payphones to investors and then
leased back the phones. Investors were promised a fixed 14% return on their
investments. After ETS declared bankruptcy, the SEC brought a civil enforcement
action against the company for violating the registration and antifraud provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
An investment system qualifies as an “investment contract” if “the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the effort of others.” The Court stressed that this definition of “investment
contract” encompasses a wide-range of schemes that seek the use of other people’s
money in return for the promise of future returns. The Court rejected Edwards’
attempt to differentiate schemes promising fixed rates of return from those offering
variable rates. In fact, the Court stressed that schemes promising fixed returns are
likely more attractive to unsophisticated investors and thus lend themselves to the
potential of even greater abuse and fraud. As a result, ETS’ sale-leaseback
agreements were “investment contracts” subject to SEC regulation. The purpose
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behind securities regulation is to regulate all investments, regardless of their
individual packaging.
The overriding lesson for transactional attorneys from this case is that the
term “investment contract” includes schemes promising a fixed rate of return.
Consequently, merely offering a fixed rate of return to investors does not remove an
investment scheme from the realm of SEC oversight – even payphones may be
securities.
Mere personal friendship, standing alone, is insufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt regarding a director’s independence. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del.
2004).
By Ryan Russell
In Beam v. Stewart, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that “[a]llegations of
mere personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence” for
purposes of a demand futility inquiry. This is true even if the non-interested
director’s relationship is with an interested co-director who owns a controlling
percentage of the corporation’s stock. A relationship renders a director unable to
consider a presuit demand only if the relationship is “of a bias-producing nature”
such that “the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her
reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.” This holding
ensures that professional and social relationships that naturally develop among
members of a board do not cause an entire board to be tainted by the membership
of a few interested directors.
Monica Beam, an owner of shares of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
(“MSO”), filed a derivative action in the Court of Chancery against Martha Stewart,
the other members of the MSO board, and one former board member. Beam
alleged that Stewart violated her fiduciary duties to MSO by illegally selling ImClone
stock and mishandling the resulting media attention. Prior to filing this action, Beam
did not demand that the MSO board pursue this claim. At the time Beam filed suit,
the MSO board consisted of six members: (1) Stewart, MSO’s chairman, CEO, and
controlling shareholder; (2) Sharon Patrick, MSO’s president and Chief Operating
Officer; (3) Arthur Martinez, an outside director and former Sears Roebuck CEO;
(4) Darla Moore, an outside director and investment banker; (5) Naomi Seligman, an
outside director and e-commerce consultant; and (6) Jeffrey Ubben, a MSO director
whose independence was undisputed. All of these directors received valuable
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benefits as a result of their board positions. Stewart could have easily removed each
due to her voting power.
The Court of Chancery would excuse Beam’s failure to make a presuit
demand upon MSO’s board if three of the directors were interested or lacked
independence. The court found that Stewart was an interested party due to her
potential civil and criminal liability. The court also found that Patrick lacked
independence because her position as an officer and inside director when combined
with her substantial compensation from MSO raised a reasonable doubt as to her
independence. Beam argued that Martinez and Moore lacked independence because
they were long-time personal friends of Stewart and Patrick. The Court of Chancery
disagreed; Beam’s claim was dismissed for failure to demonstrate the futility of
presuit demand. Beam appealed.
The Supreme Court of Delaware noted that under Aronson “a stockholder
may not pursue a derivative suit to assert a claim of the corporation unless: (a) she
has first demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and they have
wrongfully refused to do so; or (b) such demand is excused because [at least half of]
the directors are deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the
pursuit of the litigation.” The court explained that a director is deemed incapable of
making an impartial decision if he or she is interested in the outcome of the litigation
or lacks independence. A director lacks independence if there is “a reasonable doubt
that a director is not so ‘beholden’ to an interested director (in this case Stewart) that
his or her ‘discretion would be sterilized.’” At issue in this case was “the quantum of
doubt about a director’s independence that is ‘reasonable’ in order to excuse a
presuit demand.”
Beam argued that Stewart’s personal friendships with other directors were
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to the independence of those directors.
The Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed and held that a relationship renders a
director unable to consider a presuit demand only if the relationship is “of a biasproducing nature” such that “the non-interested director would be more willing to
risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.” The
court further stated that “[m]ere allegations that [Stewart and other directors] move
in the same business and social circles, or a characterization that they are close
friends, is not enough to negate independence for demand excusal purposes.” This
is true even if those allegations are combined with Stewart’s 94% voting power. The
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that presuit demand was not excused.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery dismissing Beam’s suit was
affirmed.
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This case is important because it ensures that professional and social
relationships that naturally develop among members of a board do not cause an
entire board to be tainted by the membership of a few interested directors. These
relationships are inevitable and exist among the members of most, if not all,
corporate boards. An opposite holding would effectively eviscerate the presuit
demand requirement because the futility exception would apply to nearly all
corporate boards.
TAX
What makes a hospital charitable? Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200436022, 2004 WL 1950361,
2004 PRL LEXIS 598 (June 9, 2004).
By Ted Morrissey
The following describes a private letter ruling from the IRS regarding a
hospital’s attempt to structure a joint venture and maintain its non-profit status.
The non-profit, tax-exempt hospital proposed to form a new joint venture to
create a freestanding diagnostic imaging center, but wanted to ensure that such a
venture would not endanger its non-profit status. The IRS ruled that the proposed
group of transactions would not adversely affect the hospital’s status as an exempt
organization for the purposes of federal income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a) and
(c)(3). Additionally, neither the hospital’s distributive share of income from neither
the partnership, nor the rents received from the partnership would result in unrelated
taxable income under § 512 of the Code.
First, the hospital formed a limited liability company to serve as the general
partner in a limited partnership. The hospital was the only member of the limited
liability company, and the company would be treated as a disregarded entity for
federal income tax purposes. Thus, the limited partnership that the hospital created
had as its two partners the hospital (holding 99 per cent ownership) and the limited
liability company (holding 1 per cent ownership). The hospital would then offer for
sale units of the limited partnership to physician investors and related physician
groups. If the offering were fully subscribed, the hospital would own fifty-four
partnership units, physician investors would own forty partnership units, and an
independent management company would own the remaining 5 limited partnership
units.
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In order to maintain the hospital’s tax-exempt status, the proposed venture
must be operated solely for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes (see I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)). However, the limited partnership would have for-profit partners.
The IRS used the community benefit standard to determine whether the
purpose of the partnership would affect the hospital’s non-profit status. The
community benefit standard determines whether the hospital will continue to
promote health in a charitable manner. The hospital qualified under this standard
prior to this proposed group of transactions, so the question is whether participation
in the aforementioned partnership changes how the hospital operates. The standard
focuses on a number of factors, but is generally met if the operations of the hospital
benefit the community rather than serving private interests.
The IRS noted that the hospital would continue to be operated for charitable
purposes, but went further to analyze the hospital’s participation in the partnership.
Because the partnership activities are considered to be hospital activities for the
purpose of evaluating the hospital’s exempt status, the partnership agreement cannot
prevent the hospital from operating exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose.
Thus, the agreement can only incidentally benefit for-profit partners.
The hospital specifically addressed this issue in its proposed partnership
agreement and its structure. Specifically, the partnership has a duty to operate in a
manner promoting the charitable purposes of the hospital; this duty overrides any
duty of the partnership to operate for the financial benefit of its members. Since the
limited liability company created by the hospital will be the general partner, it will
have effective control over the major decisions of the partnership. In addition to
these factors, the managing company will have a duty to operate the imaging center
for charitable purposes. Finally, all allocations of profit and losses of the partnership
will be in proportion to the ownership interests of the partners. The IRS determined
that these factors established that the participation in the joint venture would further
the hospital’s charitable purposes and allow the hospital to act in furtherance of
those purposes without unduly benefiting the for-profit partners.
Additionally, the IRS noted that any distributive share of the partnership’s
profits would not be considered unrelated business taxable income under I.R.C. §
512(c). The hospital will receive a distributive share of the profits of the partnership
through the general partner (the hospital’s disregarded entity). Therefore, the
activities of the partnership must be substantially related to the hospital’s exempt
purposes, or in other words, must further the charitable purpose of the hospital.
The IRS stated that the imaging center would provide expanded and improved
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health care to the community and that this purpose would override any duty to
maximize profits, thus satisfying the substantially related requirement.
Finally, the hospital will rent space to the partnership for the imaging center
and will receive rents from this venture. The IRS stated that the rents received from
the lease would be excluded from unrelated business taxable income. The rental
agreement stated that the space would be rented on a fixed square footage amount
rather than on the basis of the profits of the imaging center, thus meeting the
requirements of I.R.C. § 512(b)(3).
The hospital demonstrated to the IRS that its control over the partnership (as
determined under the partnership and management agreements) would enable the
hospital to maintain its charitable purposes, and thus retain its tax-exempt status.
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